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In this study, we investigate the relation between the quality of external audit and earnings pre-
dictability of firms situated in different legal and disclosure environments around the world. In a 
sample of multinational firms cross-listed in the United States, we find that the association between 
audit quality and forecast accuracy is stronger in weak legal and disclosure environments than in 
strong legal and disclosure environments. We interpret these results as suggesting that audit service 
can serve as an alternative device to improve market participants' information environment in weak 
legal and disclosure environments. 
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I. Introduction 
Financial statements are a primary source of financial information for capital market 
participants. External audit assures the quality of financial statements by providing an 
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independent assessment as to the accuracy and fairness of those statements in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. In this regard, audit quality is an important 
determinant of the quality of information contained in financial statements (Abdel-Khalik 
and Solomon, 1988). Based on this insight, Choi, Kang, and K won (2004) developed a 
model where audit quality is associated with earnings predictability in a setting where 
market participants use accounting data to predict future firm performance and where 
audit quality improves the accuracy of those accounting data. 
Prior studies find that national legal and disclosure environments influence how financial 
information is used by market participants (eg Choi and Wong, 2004; Francis, Khurana, and 
Pereira, 2003; Hope, 2003; Chang, Khanna, and Palepu, 2000; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
Choi and Wong (2004), and Francis eta! (2003) argue that national1egal environments are 
associated with audit quality. Hope (2003) finds that both the effectiveness of legal enforce-
ment and firm-level disclosure level are associated with analysts' forecast accuracy. Chang 
et a! (2000) find that financial analysts' forecasting performance is related to legal origin 
(common law versus code law) of the firms' country of domicile. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
find an association between disclosure level and analysts' forecast performance. 
While prior studies have examined separately the effects of audit quality ( eg Choi eta!, 
2004), legal environment (eg Hope 2003), and disclosure level (eg Hope 2003) on ana-
lysts' forecast accuracy, we are not aware of any prior study which has focused on how 
these variables interact in explaining financial analysts' ability to predict earnings. Given 
the current trend towards global capital market integration, globalization of audit services, 
and accounting harmonization, we believe that this question is particularly relevant to 
capital market regulators and accounting standard setters. For example, our research will 
help answer the question of whether audit service can serve as a viable alternative mecha-
nism to ensure the availability and credibility of information in countries where legal and 
disclosure environments tend to be weaker than other countries. 
Specifically, we investigate if the relation between audit quality and analysts' forecast 
accuracy (Choi eta!, 2004a) is conditional on legal and disclosure environments in firms' 
country of domicile. Choi and Wong (2004) document that external audit plays a more 
important role in mitigating agency problems in weak legal environment countries than in 
strong legal environment countries. In view of their results, we predict that audit quality 
will play a more important role in improving the accuracy of analysts' forecasts in weak 
legal environments than in strong legal environments. Similarly, we predict that financial 
analysts' earnings forecasts will be more accurate when either audit quality or corporate 
disclosure level is high. Our basic premise is that there is a trade-off between the quantity 
of financial information (ie disclosure level) and the quality of the financial information 
(eg the reliability of financial statement information, which is related to audit quality) in 
improving analysts' information environments and their forecasting performances. 
In a sample of 998 firm-year observations from 372 non-US firms cross-listed in the 
US from 31 countries, we document that the accuracy of the analysts' forecasts increases 
as the overall audit quality in the economy increases. Our results also indicate that the 
association between audit quality, measured by the Big 5 market share, and analysts' fore-
cast accuracy increases in weaker legal and disclosure environments. Our findings extend 
the literature by identifying situations where audit quality plays a more important role in 
improving analysts' information environment (ie when legal environments are weaker and 
when disclosure level is relatively low). 
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We believe that our findings are particularly relevant to stock market regulators in 
emerging economies, where legal and disclosure environments tend to be weak. This is 
because the findings suggest that improvement in the quality of audit services in those 
transitional economies could be an important step towards building a more efficient capi-
tal market, which will lead to economic growth. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review 
related prior studies and develop hypotheses. In Section III, we explain research design. 
In Section IV, we describe sample and empirical results. We present our conclusion in 
Section V. 
II. Background and Hypotheses' Development 
2.1 Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Audit Quality 
Since users of financial statements cannot observe directly firms' true earnings, they 
rely on reported accounting numbers to infer true earnings. To safeguard the credibility of 
the accounting numbers, outside independent auditors certify that they conform to gener-
ally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Consistent with the idea that higher quality 
audit enhances the reliability of reported earnings numbers, Teoh and Wong (1993) find 
that the earnings response coefficients (ERC hereafter) of Big 8 clients are significantly 
higher than those of non-Big 8 clients. 
Choi et al (2004a) develop a model where the reduction of measurement errors in 
reported accounting earnings due to a higher-quality audit enhance the market partici-
pants' ability to predict future earnings. The basic idea in this model is that earnings shock 
includes a component of accounting errors that may be corrected by external audits, and 
that the variance of accounting errors decreases as the quality of the audit service 
increases. It further shows that when accounting errors are small relative to the noise in 
analysts' private signals, consensus analysts' forecast error decreases as the accounting 
errors become smaller, implying accounting errors are reduced by a high-quality audit. 
In a similar vein, Pope (2003) notes that an important determinant of the quality of 
analysts' forecasts is the characteristic (extent and quality) of accounting information, 
which becomes an input to the forecasting model. Thus, based on the premise that higher 
quality audit produces more reliable accounting numbers, we predict that the audit quality 
in an economy is positively associated with analysts' forecast accuracy. This reasoning 
leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hl: Analysts' earnings forecasts will become more accurate as the audit quality in the 
economy increases. 
2.2 Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Interaction between Audit Quality and Legal 
Environment 
Hope (2003) documents that the effectiveness of legal environment of an economy is 
positively associated with analysts' earnings forecast accuracy. He argues that a strong 
legal environment induces managers to follow prescribed accounting and disclosure rules 
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to a greater extent, improving the reliability of the financial reports by reducing financial 
analysts' uncertainty about the accounting methods used and how they are applied. He 
thus claims that earnings are more predictable in more effective legal environments. The 
basic idea here is that stricter enforcement improves firms' information environment in the 
sense that it reduces "noise" in accounting numbers, facilitating market participants' fore-
casting tasks. 2 
Hung (2000) and Ball (200 1) argue that strong legal enforcement should attenuate 
management opportunism in financial reporting. Leuz et al (2003) show that earnings 
management is more pervasive in countries where the level of legal enforcement is weak, 
because in these countries insiders enjoy greater private control benefits and have stronger 
incentives to obfuscate firm performance. Prior literature also suggests that analysts are 
either not motivated to account for or not capable of anticipating such earnings manage-
ment in their forecasts (eg Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). 
It is possible that legal environments and audit quality jointly influence analysts' fore-
cast accuracy. To the extent that high quality audit constrains firms' use of opportunistic 
and questionable accounting methods and practices (thus making earnings more predict-
able), we predict that quality audit will play a more important role in limiting managerial 
opportunism for firms domiciled in weak legal environments. In weak legal environments, 
managers tend to manipulate earnings more extensively than in stronger legal enforce-
ment regimes (Leuz et al 2003). 
For example, Fan and Wong (2003) show that auditors play an important role in weak 
legal environment countries. Choi and Wong (2004) document that the auditor's role in 
mitigating agency problems is greater in weak legal environment countries than in strong 
legal environment countries. Similarly, Dyck and Zingales (2002) and Klapper and Love 
(2002) document that firm-level corporate governance provisions increase firms' market 
valuations more in weak legal environments than in strong legal environments. 
Lang et al (2003) document that the number of analysts following a firm and cross-
listing can have a more positive impact on firm valuation in countries with poorer investor 
protection than in countries with stronger investor protection. These findings are consist-
ent with the view that while there are other alternative mechanisms to ensure the reliability 
of accounting numbers in strong legal environments, those mechanisms either do not exist 
or are much less effective in weak legal environments. Thus, we predict that audit quality 
will play a more important role in weak legal environments. Our next hypothesis (in an 
alternative form) is: 
H2: Audit quality will play a bigger role in explaining analysts' forecast accuracy in weak 
legal environments. 
2.3 Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Interaction between Audit Quality and Disclosure 
Environment 
Prior studies suggest that earnings become more predictable with disclosure level. 
Alford et al (1993) survey cross-country differences in the extensiveness of disclosure 
2 By "noise" we refer to the portion of earnings signal that is not informative for future earnings. 
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practices, and find that these differences are reflected in the information content and time-
liness of earnings. Basu, Hwang, and Jan (1998) study the influence of country-level 
disclosure differences on earnings variability and predictability, and document that ac-
counting systems with more frequent and higher quality disclosures result in lower analysts' 
forecast errors. More recently, Hope (2003) finds that the quantity of annual report disclo-
sure (measured by the CIFAR scores) is positively associated with analysts' earnings forecast 
accuracy. 
It is possible that audit quality and disclosure level jointly influence forecast accuracy. 
If the overall disclosure level is high in an economy and as a result the information envi-
ronment is rich, then it is possible for market participants (including analysts) to predict 
future earnings more accurately using the available information even if audit quality is not 
high. However, in weak disclosure environments where the information environment is 
generally weak, the quality of audit service might play a more important role in analysts' 
forecasting performance. The underlying idea is that the reliability of accounting informa-
tion (ie the quality of available information) will be more crucial in improving analysts' 
forecasting performance when the disclosure level (ie the quantity of available informa-
tion) is low, and vice versa. To test this prediction, we formulate our next hypothesis (in an 
alternative form) as: 
H3: Audit quality will play a bigger role in explaining analysts' forecast accuracy in weak 
disclosure environments. 
III. Empirical Testing 
Following Lang and Lundholm ( 1996 ), forecast accuracy (ACCURACY) is measured 
by the negative of the absolute value of forecast error scaled by stock price at timet. More 
specifically, FORECAST.'-1 denotes the mean IIB/E/S consensus forecast of period t earn-
ings made at time t-1, EPS, is the actual earnings per share before extraordinary items at 
time t, taken from I/B/E/S, and PRICE, is the stock price at the end of period t. Then, 
forecast accuracy is defined as 
I FORECAST t-l - EPS I 
ACCURACY= (-1) ' ' (l) 
' PRICE, 
Next, we use the following empirical specifications, which control for previously iden-
tified determinants of forecast accuracy and dispersion, to test the first hypothesis derived 
in the previous section. 
ACCURACY = l/J0 + l/J1 B5SHARE + l/J2 LEGENY + l/J3 DISCLENY 
Where, 
B5SHARE: 
LEGENY: 
+ l/)4 SIZE+ l/J5 SURPRISE+ l/J6 LOSS + l/J7 SKEW+ E (2) 
Big 5 audit firms' market share in the economy as of 1998, taken from 
Francis et al (2003); 
Overall effectiveness of legal enforcement computed as a linear com-
bination of the enforcement variables. Two variables are used as the 
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proxy. LEGENVl is measured in the same manner as in Leuz et al 
(2003), and it is a linear combination of three legal environment vari-
ables in La Porta et al ( 1998): efficiency of judiciary system, rule of 
law, and corruption. LEGENV2 is a linear combination of five legal 
environment variables found in La Porta et al (1998): efficiency of 
judiciary system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and 
risk of repudiation;3 
DISCLENV: Overall disclosure environment in the economy, measured as the CIFAR 
country-level disclosure index score (1995); 
SIZE: Log of market value of equity at fiscal year end month; 
SURPRISE: The absolute value of earnings surprise, computed using the last year's 
earnings as the expectation, deflated by stock price; 
LOSS: Indicator variable that takes the value of zero (one) if the reported 
EPS is positive (negative); 
SKEW: The negative of skewedness in firms' earnings, calculated using past 
five years' earnings.4 
The market share held by the elite international Big 5 accounting firms (B5SHARE) in 
a country is used to proxy for the overall audit quality of firms in the economy. This 
variable has been used as a proxy for audit quality in previous studies based on the idea 
that it represents demand for quality audits (see, for instance, Francis et al2003). A number 
of studies have documented that Big 5 audit firms have brand-name reputation, charge 
higher audit fees, and/or behave qualitatively differently from smaller audit firms (see, for 
instance, Craswell et al, 1995; Francis and Krishnan, 1995; Francis and Reynolds, 2000).5 
In this study, we choose Big 5 market share in a country, rather than firm-level auditor 
association, as the proxy for audit quality in view of Choi et al (2004b ). Choi et al (2004b) 
suggest that Big 5 auditors tend to provide relatively similar quality audit services across 
the world, while the quality of audit non-Big 5 auditors provide varies with local legal 
'La Porta et al. ( 1998) quantify each of the five dimensions of legal enforcement on a scale of zero to ten, 
and sum up the five enforcement scores (eg efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation) to obtain overall country-level enforcement scores. We adopt 
their enforcement score in our study. 
4 Skewedness is computed in the following manner: 
Where xj, is the actual earnings per share before extraordinary items for firm j in period t, ~ is the mean 
and sj is the standard deviation of xj,• based on nj observations for each firm. 
5 Palmrose (1998) documents that large audit firms have less litigation activity than smaller audit firms. 
Beatty (1989) finds that there is less underpricing for large auditor client firms in initial public offerings. 
Dopuch and Simunic ( 1980) argue that investors may rationally perceive Big 8 auditors as of higher quality 
because larger auditors have more of the observable characteristics associated with quality (ie specialised 
training, accreditation by some reputable agency, and peer reviews). In contrast, Imhoff (1988) surveyed 
financial analysts and found that they perceive no differences in audit quality between large and small auditors. 
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requirements.6 They further show that both Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors provide higher 
quality audit services in stronger legal environments than in weaker legal environments, 
but that the difference in the quality of audit services provided by Big 5 (non-Big 5) 
auditors varies less (more) with the strength of legal environments. 
This means that it is difficult to compare the audit quality of a non-Big 5 in a strong 
legal environment versus the audit quality provided by a Big 5 in a weak legal environ-
ment. By using a firm-level Big 5/non Big 5 dummy, one basically assumes that the audit 
quality of a Big 5 in a weak legal environment is higher than that of a non-Big 5 in a strong 
legal environment, an assumption that is not supported in their study. Due to these reasons, 
we claim that using Big 5 market share variable alleviates concerns related to using 
firm-level auditor association variable in a cross-country setting, and we use the market 
share information to measure the overall audit quality in an economy. 7 
Next, we control for the effectiveness of legal environment (eg legal enforcement) 
based on Hope (2003), who shows that analysts' forecasts become more accurate as legal 
enforcement in a country becomes more effective. We adopt two measures of legal envi-
ronment. First, LEGENY! is based on Leuz eta! (2003), who measure legal enforcement 
as a linear combination of three legal environment variables (ie judicial efficiency, rule of 
law, and corruption) in La Porta eta! ( 1998). Second, LEGENY2 is based on La Porta eta! 
(1998), who measure legal environment (ie legal enforcement) using five institutional 
variables (ie judicial efficiency, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of 
repudiation). Based on Hope (2003), we predict that the coefficient on LEGENY (ie, both 
LEGENY! and LEGENY2) would be positive. 
DISCLENY is included to control for overall disclosure environment in the economy, 
using the 1995 disclosure index produced by the Center for International Financial Analy-
sis and Research (CIFAR) as the proxy.8 The coefficient on DISCLEY is expected to be 
positive, based on the findings of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) and Hope (2003), who 
report that the forecasts become more accurate as the required disclosure level of the home 
country of the firm increases. Firm size (SIZE) is included based on Lang and Lundholm 
(1996), who document a positive association between firm size and forecast accuracy. 
• In contrast, a study of Khurana and Raman (2004) provides different evidence that perceived audit 
quality difference between Big 5 and non-Big 5 is greater in the US than in weaker legal environment countries. 
However, their proxy for audit quality (ex-ante cost of capital) is not a direct measure of perceived audit 
quality and their sample is limited to four common law nations (ie US, UK, Canada, and Australia). 
1 Nevertheless, we examine whether firm-level Big 5 auditor choice influences our results by performing 
the analyses only on firms that are audited by Big 5 (n = 472). This way, we circumvent potential confounding 
effects stemming from Big 5 I non Big 5 audit quality differences. The results are the same as the ones 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 - all of the variables are significant in the predicted directions. Yet an alternative 
approach would have been to use the country-level audit spending. However, as Hope (2003) notes, this proxy 
is also problematic in the sense that audit fees can reflect factors other than audit quality, such as cost drivers 
and litigation risk. 
'The CIFAR index, which has been used extensively in recent research, rates the annual reports of I ,000 
leading companies from 41 countries for their inclusion and exclusion of 85 items (see Hope, 2003, for validity 
tests of the CJFAR index and further references). 
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Earnings surprise (SURPRISE) is included based on Lang and Lundholm ( 1996), who 
find that larger changes in earnings are associated with less accurate forecasts. Firm-year 
loss (LOSS) is included based on Hwang et al (1996), who find that analysts' forecasts 
of loss are on average less accurate than forecasts of profit firms. Earnings skewedness 
(SKEW) is included based on Gu and Wu (2003), who document that skewed earnings are 
associated with more optimistically biased forecasts. 
Next, to test hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the following regression model, which 
includes two interaction terms between LEGENY and B5SHARE, and DISCLENV and 
B5SHARE: 
ACCURACY = ¢0 + ¢1 B5SHARE + ¢2 LEGENY + ¢3 LEGENY* B5SHARE 
+ ¢4 DISCLENV + ¢5 DISCLENV* B5SHARE + ¢6 SIZE 
+ ¢7 SURPRISE+ l/JR LOSS + ¢9 SKEW+ E (3) 
We expect a positive coefficient on B5SHARE based on hypothesis l, which derives 
from Choi et al (2004a). However, we are more interested in how the two interaction terms 
are associated with ACCURACY in this regression. As we predicted in hypotheses 2 and 
3, if the association between analysts' forecast accuracy and audit quality (B5SHARE) is 
greater in weak legal (disclosure) environments, these interaction terms will have negative 
signs. We correct for potential heteroscedasticity in all of the regression models using the 
White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
In estimating these models using the conventional ordinary least squares approach (ie 
OLS), we note that each country does not have a similar number of observations included 
in the sample. Such an uneven country representation of sample firms is a concern because 
our test variables are country-level variables. This means that estimating OLS in the pooled 
sample will bias the results towards firms that have a higher representation in the sample. 
One way of avoiding this bias is to make the number of observations represented from 
each country equal by matching firms based on a set criterion. However, this is likely to 
reduce the sample size and thus decrease the statistical power of our tests. An alternative 
approach, which we believe is more desirable, is to run weighted least squares regressions 
using the country representation as the weight (Choi and Wong, 2004). This way, we cir-
cumvent the econometrica! problems associated with uneven country representation and 
preserve the statistical power of the tests. For these reasons, we estimate country-weighted 
least squares regressions for all our models. 
IV. Sample and Results 
Sample 
The sample period spans from 1992 to 1999, and the sample consists of non-US firms 
cross-listed in the US whose analysts' earnings forecasts are available in 2001 1/B/E/S 
Summary files9 and whose home countries are identified in the year 2000 Bank of New 
9 As Das and Saudagaran ( 1998) note, 1/B/E/S/ forecasts on the cross-listed firms are based on their home 
country earnings. 
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York Guide to Depository Receipts. 10 This sample ensures homogeneity of sample with 
respect to various institutional features that might affect analysts' forecast accuracy. For 
instance, ADRs circumvent the presence of capital market segmentation, and they tend to 
be well-diversified multinational firms. 11 In addition, we believe that using ADRs is a 
more conservative test of our hypotheses because by cross-listing in the US market, firms 
become more similar to US firms (eg being subject to US security laws). 
Our final sample consists of 998 firm-year observations from 372 firms available 
during the eight-year period. 12 The sample consists of non-US firms cross-listed in the US, 
originating from 31 distinct countries including some developed countries (eg UK and 
Japan) as well as emerging market countries (eg Mexico and Thailand). 
Table I summarises home country distributions of our sample firms (and sample firm-
years) and key country-level variables. UK has the largest number of observations (n=160), 
followed by Mexico (n=104) and Japan (n=92). B5SHARE (as of 1998) in our sample 
countries varies from 0.361 (Portugal) to 0.967 (Chile)Y The sum of LEGENY! and 
LEGENY2 is the highest (80.0) in Switzerland and the lowest (30.8) in the Philippines. 
DISCLENY is the highest (85) in UK and the lowest (56) in Brazil and Portugal. Table 2, 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics of all variables used in our regression models, and 
Table 2, Panel B provides Pearson correlation matrix among those variables. 14 The mean 
(median) analysts' forecast accuracy in the entire sample is -0.033 (-0.013), and the mean 
(median) Big 5 market share in the sample countries is 0.788 (0.798). 
Not surprisingly, our control variables are significantly correlated with analysts' fore-
cast accuracy (ACCURACY) as we predicted, except for SKEW. Consistent with Hope 
(2003), our proxies for legal enforcement environments (LEGENY) and accounting dis-
closure environments (DISCLENY) are positively and significantly correlated with 
10 This data source has been used extensively in prior studies such as Amir et al. ( 1993) and Lang et al. 
(2003), among others. 
" For instance, Hope and Kang (2005) suggests that the degree of capital market segmentation might 
affect analysts' forecast accuracy and Duru and Reeb (2002) find that global diversification affects analysts' 
forecast accuracy. 
12 This sample size is fairly large for a study that examines cross-listed firms. For instance, Miller ( 1999) 
had 181 firm-year observations in his sample, and Ashbaugh and Olsson (2002) had 36. 
13 In our sample, over 90 per cent of firm-year observations are audited by Big 5 auditors. At the country 
level, the observations from 16 countries out of 31 are entirely audited by Big 5 auditors. This is because US 
cross-listed foreign firms are usually large firms in their domestic market and these large firms are mostly 
audited by Big 5 auditors even in weak legal environment countries. In addition, this paper's main focus is on 
how country-level audit quality, not firm-level audit quality, interacts with legal and disclosure environments 
in determining the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. It may be difficult to simply compare the differences between 
the clients of Big 5 firms with those of non-Big 5 across the world, because the audit quality of Big 5 in the US 
may not be equal to that of the same Big 5 in a given country. 
14 These descriptive statistics and correlations are calculated using entire observations. Thus, they may be 
biased in that a few countries with greater numbers of observations dominate the other countries that have 
only a few numbers of observations. 
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Table 1 
Home Country Distribution of Sample Firms and Country-Level Variables 
Home Country Number of Number of BSSHARE LEGENVI LEGENV2 DISCLENV 
Firms Firm-Years 
Argentina II 23 0.756 17.37 28.2 68 
Australia 18 40 0.827 28.52 46.5 80 
Austria 2 2 0.456 28.07 47.4 62 
Belgium 3 9 0.607 28.32 47.4 68 
Brazil 21 38 0.869 18.49 32.3 56 
Chile 17 47 0.967 19.57 33.9 78 
Colombia 5 10 0.440 14.33 28.3 58 
Denmark 2 7 0.876 30.00 49.0 75 
Finland 2 9 0.829 30.00 48.8 83 
France 21 77 0.554 26.05 44.9 78 
Germany 17 44 0.565 27.16 46.8 67 
Hong Kong 27 61 0.895 26.74 43.9 73 
Ireland 5 10 0.924 25.02 43.7 81 
Italy 14 48 0.964 21.21 39.7 66 
Japan 32 92 0.717 27.50 46.9 71 
Korea 4 7 0.672 16.65 33.6 68 
Malaysia 5 10 0.733 23.16 38.5 79 
Mexico 39 104 0.798 16.12 30.0 71 
Netherlands 24 73 0.936 30.00 49.3 74 
New Zealand 5 9 0.884 30.00 49.0 80 
Norway 3 8 0.895 30.00 49.6 75 
Philippines 4 0.763 10.40 20.4 64 
Portugal 2 0.361 21.56 39.0 56 
Singapore 7 26 0.888 26.79 45.0 79 
South Africa 2 0.929 19.34 33.5 79 
Spain 7 17 0.931 21.43 39.4 72 
Sweden 10 41 0.796 30.00 49.0 83 
Switzerland 6 16 0.899 30.00 50.0 80 
Taiwan 0.580 22.12 40.4 58 
Thailand I 0.572 14.68 29.7 66 
United Kingdom 60 160 0.736 27.67 47.0 85 
NOTE: 
A list of currently cross-listed securities (as of February 2000) was obtained from the Bank of New York 
Global Investors Guide. B5SHARE is the Big 5 market in the economy as of 1998. LEGENV I is measured in 
the same manner as in Leuz et al (2003), and it is a linear combination of three legal environment variables in 
La Porta et al ( 1998): they are efficiency of judiciary system, rule of law, and corruption. LEGENV2 is a linear 
combination of five legal environment variables found in La Porta eta!. ( 1998): they are efficiency of judiciary 
system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of repudiation. DISCLENV is the country-level 
CIFAR index disclosure score (1995). 
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Table2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev Min 
ACCURACY -0.033 -0.013 0.055 -0.496 
B5SHARE 0.788 0.798 0.129 0.361 
LEGENY! 24.860 27.160 4.814 10.400 
LEGENY2 42.495 46.500 7.002 20.400 
DISCLENY 74.796 74.000 7.333 56.000 
SIZE 7.938 8.228 1.772 2.184 
SURPRISE 0.005 -0.003 0.074 -0.411 
LOSS 0.079 0.000 0.270 0.000 
SKEW -0.054 0.073 1.197 -2.043 
NOTE: 
47 
Max 
0.000 
0.967 
30.000 
50.000 
85.000 
12.144 
0.540 
1.000 
2.070 
ACCURACY is the accuracy in analysts' earnings forecasts, measured as the forecast available at the beginning 
month of the fiscal year and the actual earnings per share for the year. B5SHARE is the Big 5 market in the 
economy as of 1998. LEGENY I is measured in the same manner as in Leuz et al (2003), and it is a linear 
combination of three legal environment variables in La Porta et al (1998): they are efficiency of judiciary 
system, rule of law, and corruption. LEGENY2 is a linear combination of five legal environment variables 
found in La Porta et al (1998): they are efficiency of judiciary system, rule of law, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of repudiation. DISCLENY is the country-level CIFAR index disclosure score ( 1995). 
SIZE is the log of market value of equity at fiscal year end month. SURPRISE is this year's earnings minus 
last year's earnings deflated by stock price. LOSS is coded as zero (one) for firm-year observations with 
negative earnings. SKEW is earnings skewedness based on the prior five years of earnings. 
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ACCURACY. The market value of equity (SIZE) is also positively and significantly corre-
lated with ACCURACY, consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996). Earnings Surprise 
(SURPRISE) and negative earnings (LOSS) are negatively and significantly correlated 
with ACCURACY as prior studies documented. More importantly, the correlation be-
tween ACCURACY and our proxy for audit quality (B5SHARE) is positive and significant, 
providing a univariate support for our hypothesis 1, which suggests more accurate 
analysts' forecasts for firms domiciled in jurisdictions where audit quality is higher. 15 
Results 
Table 3 reports the results of our regression (2), which tests the association between 
Big 5 market share and analysts' forecast accuracy. In models I and 2, we use LEGENY I 
(a linear combination of efficiency of judiciary system, rule of law, and corruption) to 
proxy for legal enforcement environments of the economy, and in models 3 and 4, we use 
LEGENV2 (LEGENVl plus risk of expropriation and risk of repudiation) to represent 
legal environment. 
In models 1 and 3, where we exclude firm-level control variables and DISCLENV, we 
find that forecast accuracy increases with the country's legal environment (l/J2> 0). This 
finding is consistent with Hope (2003). Supporting hypothesis 1, we also find that 
analysts' forecast accuracy increases as the Big 5 market share in the economy increases 
(l/J1> 0), suggesting that the analysts' forecasts become more accurate as the overall audit 
quality in the economy increases (eg Choi et al, 2004a). 
In models 2 and 4, where we include firm-level control variables and DISCLENV, the 
coefficient on B5SHARE becomes more significant across specifications. In including 
DISCLENV in the regression, we note that this variable is highly correlated with the legal 
environment measures. For instance, the correlation between LEGENVl and DISCLENV 
is .546 and the correlation between LEGENV2 and DISCLENV is .557. Thus, including 
both the disclosure variable and the legal environment variables directly is likely to create 
multicollinearity and make an interpretation of the coefficients difficult. To avoid this 
problem, we orthogonalise the disclosure variable and the legal environment variables by 
regressing the legal enforcement variables on DISCLENV and using the residuals from 
15 Among the correlations reported in Panel B of Table 2, the correlations between BSSHARE and legal 
environments (LEGENY I, and LEGENY2) are all negative, which is inconsistent with the findings of prior 
studies. This is because of unequal distributions of the percentage of the sample firms included in the sample 
out of total listed firms in the domestic market when Francis eta! (2003) calculated the market share of Big 5 
in each country. For example, only a few extremely large firms in very weak legal environment countries are 
included in Francis et al's sample, whereas a higher percentage of firms are included from strong legal 
environment countries. The large firms included in the data from weak legal environment countries are likely 
to be audited by the Big 5 while small firms from strong legal environment countries are not always audited by 
Big 5. If we calculate correlation based on the weighted version of our samples, the correlation becomes 
positively significant. The correlation between BSSHARE and LEGENY! is 0.206, while that between 
BSSHARE and LEGENY2 is 0.151. This finding also suggests that the unequal number of observations across 
different countries contributes to the negative correlations reported in the table. We perform several sensitivity 
checks to solve this problem. 
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A Test of the Association between Audit Market Share and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy (N=998) 
ACCURACY = ¢0 + ¢1 B5SHARE + ¢2 LEGENY + I/J3 DISCLENY + ¢4 SIZE + ¢5 SURPRISE 
+ 1/16 LOSS + ¢7 SKEW + E (2) 
When LEGENY is LEGENY 1 When LEGENY is LEGENY2 
Variable Predicted Sign Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 
Intercept (?) -0.083 -0.103 -0.098 -0.104 
(-17.62)'" (-18.14)"' (-17.83)'" (-18.47)"' 
B5SHARE (+) 0.020 0.018 0.023 0.020 
(5.59)"' (6.32)"' (6.32)"' (6.98)"' 
LEGENY1 (+) 0.002 0.001 
(13.61)'" (12.47)"' 
LEGENY2 (+) 0.001 0.001 
(14.06)'" (12.85)'" 
DISCLENY (+) 0.001 0.001 
(7.51 )'" (7.71)"' 
SIZE (+) 0.005 0.005 
(13.69)"' (13.30)"' 
SURPRISE (-) -0.295 -0.295 
(-17.69)"' (-17.69)'" 
LOSS (-) -0.064 -0.065 
( -20.09)'" (-20.14)'" 
SKEW (-) -0.003 -0.003 
(-8.98)"' (-8.90)'" 
Adj. R-sq. 0.021 0.384 0.023 0.384 
F-Stat 106.11'" 325.72'" 111.86"' 327.68'" 
NOTE: 
ACCURACY is the accuracy in analysts' earnings forecasts, measured as the forecast available as of the 
beginning month of the fiscal year and the actual earnings per share for the year. B5SHARE is the Big 5 
market in the economy as of 1998. LEGENY! is measured in the same manner as in Leuz eta! (2003), and it 
is a linear combination of three legal environment variables in La Porta et a! ( 1998): they are efficiency of 
judiciary system, rule of law, and corruption. LEGENY2 is a linear combination of five legal environment 
variables found in La Porta eta! (1998): they are efficiency of judiciary system, rule of law, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of repudiation. DISCLENY is the country-level CIFAR index disclosure score ( 1995). 
SIZE is the log of market value of equity at fiscal year end month. SURPRISE is this year's earnings minus 
last year's earnings deflated by stock price. LOSS is coded as zero (one) for firm-year observations with 
negative earnings. SKEW is earnings skewedness based on the prior five years of earnings. ***, **, *indicate 
significance at I, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All !-statistics are based on White's heteroscedasticity-corrected 
standard errors ( 1980). The results were obtained by the country-weighted OLS method. 
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this regression as our empirical measure of legal environment in regressions where we 
include both disclosure and legal environment variables (ie models 2 and 4 in Table 3 and 
models in Table 4). 
In models reported in Table 3, the coefficients on B5SHARE have coefficients esti-
mates of about 0.02 with t-statistics above 6.0 (p<O.Ol). This means that for every two per 
cent increase in the Big 5 market share of an economy, the forecast on average becomes 
about 1.2 per cent more accurate (eg 0.0004/0.033). The adjusted R-square of models 2 
and 4 is around 38 per cent, with an F-statistic above 325 (p<O.O 1 ). The coefficients on 
LEGENY and DISCENY are all positive and significant at p<O.Ol, implying that both 
legal environments and disclosure environments in firms' country of domicile are associ-
ated with analysts' forecast performance. The coefficients on the other firm-level control 
variables (SIZE, SURPRISE, LOSS, and SKEW) are all significant (all at p<O.Ol level) 
and have predicted signs, consistent with previous studies. Taken together, the results indi-
cate that after controlling for firm-specific and country-specific factors, analysts' forecast 
performance in an economy increases with the audit quality in the economy. 
Next, Table 4 documents the results from estimating regression (3), which tests the 
interaction between audit quality (Big 5 market share) and legal/disclosure environ-
ments in explaining analysts' forecast accuracy. Panel A of Table 4 reports results from 
estimating regression models that test hypotheses 2 and 3 separately, including one 
interaction term at a time (either LEGENY*B5SHARE or DISCLENY*B5SHARE) in 
the regressions. Panel B tests the two hypotheses jointly by adding both interaction 
terms in the regressions. 
In models 1 and 2 of Panel A, we note that the coefficient on the interaction terms 
between LEGENY and B5SHARE is significant and negative (¢3< 0). This means that 
while analysts' forecasts become more accurate as Big 5 market share (audit quality) in 
the economy increases, the improvement in the accuracy is larger when the legal environ-
ment in the firms' country of domicile is weaker. It implies that audit quality plays a more 
important role in improving the information environment in weaker legal regimes. This 
finding supports hypothesis 2. 
Turning to the results from estimating models 3 and 4 reported in Panel A of the same 
table, we observe that the interaction between audit quality and disclosure environments is 
also negative ( ¢5< 0). These results are not sensitive to alternative legal environment vari-
ables; the results do not change whether we use LEGENY I or LEGENY2 to control for 
the country's legal environment. These results suggest that audit quality plays a relatively 
bigger role in improving firms' information environment when disclosure is less compre-
hensive.16 
When both interaction terms, LEGENY*B5SHARE and DISCLENY*B5SHARE, are 
entered in the regressions at the same time, the results in Table 4, Panel B are qualitatively 
the same as the earlier results reported in Panel A. The other firm-level and country-level 
control variables have predicted significant coefficients, and the coefficient on B5SHARE 
is significant and positive. Further, all the interaction terms have a significant and negative 
coefficient, consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3. 
16 None of the VIF (variance inflation factor) values exceeds 2, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
serious issue in our estimation. 
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A Test of the Interaction between Audit Market Share and Legal (Disclosure) Environment for 
Explaining Analysts' Forecast Accuracy (N=998) 
ACCURACY= 1{!0 + ¢1 BSSHARE + ¢2 LEGENY + ¢3 LEGENY* B5SHARE + ¢4 DISCLENY 
+ ¢5 DISCLENY* B5SHARE +¢,SIZE+ ¢7 SURPRISE+ ¢8 LOSS+ ¢,SKEW+ E (3) 
Panel A: Models I through 4 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Intercept (?) 
B5SHARE (+) 
LEGENY! (+) 
LEGENY!* (?) 
B5SHARE 
LEGENV2 (+) 
LEGENV2* (?) 
B5SHARE 
DISCLENV (+) 
DISCLENY* (?) 
BSSHARE 
SIZE (+) 
SURPRISE (-) 
LOSS (-) 
SKEW (-) 
Adj. R-sq. 
F-Stat 
NOTE: 
Modell 
-0.108 
(-16.04)'" 
0.023 
(6.03)'" 
0.002 
(3.52)'" 
-0.001 
(-1.86)' 
0.001 
(7.51)'" 
0.005 
(13.27)'" 
-0.295 
(-17.68)"' 
-0.065 
(-20.15)"' 
-0.003 
(-8.86)'" 
0.385 
293.86"' 
Model2 
-0.108 
(-16.60)"' 
0.022 
(6.28)'" 
0.004 
(4.79)"' 
-0.003 
( -3.25)'" 
0.001 
(7.52)"' 
0.005 
(13.58)'" 
-0.295 
(-17.69)"' 
-0.065 
(-20.13)'" 
-0.003 
(-8.90)"' 
0.385 
289.52'" 
Model3 
-0.169 
(-5.60)"' 
0.107 
(2.71)'" 
0.001 
(12.93)'" 
0.001 
(3.35)"' 
-0.001 
(-2.27)" 
0.005 
(13.27)"' 
-0.294 
(-17.65)"' 
-0.065 
(-20.24)'" 
-0.003 
(-8.94)'" 
0.385 
287.15"' 
Model4 
-0.184 
(-5.99)"' 
0.127 
(3.18)'" 
0.001 
(12.60)"' 
0.002 
(3.82)'" 
-0.002 
(-2.80)'" 
0.005 
(13.62)'" 
-0.294 
(-17.65)'" 
-0.065 
(-20.20)'" 
-0.003 
(-9.03)"' 
0.385 
285.78"' 
ACCURACY is the accuracy in analysts' earnings forecasts, measured as the forecast available as of the 
beginning month of the fiscal year and the actual earnings per share for the year. B5SHARE is the Big 5 
market in the economy as of 1998. LEGENY! is measured in the same manner as in Leuz eta! (2003), and it 
is a linear combination of three legal environment variables in La Porta et a! ( 1998): they are efficiency of 
judiciary system, rule of law, and corruption. LEGENY2 is a linear combination of five legal environment 
variables found in La Porta et al ( 1998): they are efficiency of judiciary system, rule of law, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of repudiation. DISCLENY is the country-level CIFAR index disclosure score ( 1995). 
SIZE is the log of market value of equity at fiscal year end month. SURPRISE is this year's earnings minus 
last year's earnings deflated by stock price. LOSS is coded as zero (one) for firm-year observations with 
negative earnings. SKEW is earnings skewed ness based on the prior five years of earnings.***,**,* indicate 
significance at I, 5, and I 0% level, respectively. All the !-statistics are based on White's heteroscedasticity-
corrected standard errors ( 1980). The results were obtained by the country-weighted OLS method. 
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A Test of the Interaction between Audit Market Share and Legal (Disclosure) Environment for 
Explaining Analysts' Forecast Accuracy (N=998) 
Panel B: Models 5 through 6 
Variable Predicted Sign Modell Mode12 Model3 Model4 
Intercept (?) -0.197 -0.184 
( -5.97)'" (-5.28)"' 
BSSHARE (+) 0.142 0.124 
(3.35)"' (2.79)'" 
LEGENY! (+) 0.004 
(4.83)"' 
LEGENY!* (?) -0.003 
BSSHARE (-3.37)'" 
LEGENY2 (+) 0.002 
(3.59)'" 
LEGENY2* (?) -0.002 
BSSHARE (-2.11)" 
DISCLENY (+) 0.002 0.002 
(3.94)'"' (3.35)'" 
DISCLENY* (?) -0.002 -0.001 
BSSHARE (-2.96)'" ( -2.39)'" 
SIZE (+) 0.005 0.005 
(13.48)'" ( 13.22)'"' 
SURPRISE (-) -0.294 -0.294 
(-17.65)"" ( -17.64)'" 
LOSS (-) -0.065 -0.065 
(-20.24)'" (-20.26)"' 
SKEW (-) -0.003 -0.003 
(-8.95)"' (-8.90)'" 
Adj. R-sq. 0.385 0.385 
F-Stat 259.72'" 263.38'" 
NOTE: 
53 
ACCURACY is the accuracy in analysts' earnings forecasts, measured as the forecast available as of the 
beginning month of the fiscal year and the actual earnings per share for the year. BSSHARE is the Big 5 
market in the economy as of 1998. LEGENY I is measured in the same manner as in Leuz et al (2003), and it 
is a linear combination of three legal environment variables in La Porta et a! ( 1998): they are efficiency of 
judiciary system, rule of law, and corruption. LEGENY2 is a linear combination of five legal environment 
variables found in La Porta eta! ( 1998): they are efficiency of judiciary system, rule of law, corruption, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of repudiation. DISCLENY is the country-level CIFAR index disclosure score (1995). 
SIZE is the log of market value of equity at fiscal year end month. SURPRISE is this year's earnings minus 
last year's earnings deflated by stock price. LOSS is coded as zero (one) for firm-year observations with 
negative earnings. SKEW is earnings skewed ness based on the prior five years of earnings. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at I, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All !-statistics are based on White's heteroscedasticity-corrected 
standard errors (1980). The results were obtained by the country-weighted OLS method. 
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As robustness checks, we conduct a set of additional tests to see whether our main 
results are not driven by some other factors. First, we tested if our results hold after con-
trolling for the industry membership of our sample firms ( eg Sinha et al, 1997) and whether 
they are not explained by some macroeconomic factors that affect firm performance 
economy-wide (eg Hope and Kang, 2004). To control for industry effects, we created 
thirty-eight dummy variables based on the industry classification scheme identified in the 
Bank of New York ADR directory, and included in the regressions (the results are 
untabulated). To control for macroeconomic uncertainty, we used the macroeconomic un-
certainty factors reported in Hope and Kang (2004 ). 17 Our main results were not affected 
by controlling for industry and macroeconomic factors. 
Second, we use different measures of Big 5 market share data. The data that we used 
originally are taken from Francis et al (2003). We use data from Choi and Wong (2004) but 
the results are almost identical. Third, it may be possible that the unequal representation of 
sample from each country could influence the calculation of Big 5 market share. To solve 
this problem, we add the percentage of sample firms used to calculate the Big 5 market 
share out of total number of listed firms in the domestic market as additional control vari-
able in our regression. The percentage variable has positively significant coefficients in 
every regression but the empirical results for the other variables do not change, except that 
the significance of the interaction term between DISCLENV and B5SHARE becomes 
weaker than before. 
We also repeat the tests with equation (2) or (3) after removing observations from 
firms belonging to under-represented countries (defined as less than ten observations), but 
the results are almost identical. Fourth, it is possible that auditor choice is endogenous in 
the regression model. To control for this possibility, we use the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach where we use GNP and legal origin as exogenous determinants of Big 5 market 
share. Empirical results using the IV approach are qualitatively similar as before: all of the 
regression variables are significant in the same direction. While we believe that this ap-
proach provides a reasonable control for endogeneity, the extent to which any remaining 
endogeneity in firms' auditor selection influences our inference is unclear. 
Fifth, we re-estimate our regression models using the quintile ranks of our variables of 
interest - BSSHARE, LEGENY, and DISCLENV. The results are similar under this 
approach in the sense that the interaction terms continue to be significant in the same 
direction as earlier. Lastly, we substitute the firm-level forecast accuracy figures with the 
country mean forecast accuracy numbers as the dependent variable, in order to examine 
more directly the association between forecast accuracy and our test variables at the 
country level. However, the results do not change. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The goal of this study has been to investigate the relation between the quality of exter-
nal audit, which affects the quality of financial statement data, and the predictability of 
17 These factors are based on a factor analysis of country inflation rate and foreign exchange volatility. See 
Hope and Kang (2005) for details. 
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earnings by financial analysts in different institutional settings (ie legal and disclosure 
environments) around the world. We find that the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts 
increases as audit quality (measured by the Big 5 market share) in the economy increases. 
We interpret these results as being consistent with the notion that a higher quality audit 
reduces measurement errors in accounting numbers of the economy, making accounting 
numbers more reliable and informative about future earnings (eg Choi et al2004a). 
Further, we document that the positive association between forecast accuracy and au-
dit quality is stronger in weak legal and disclosure environments, suggesting that audit 
quality plays a more important role in improving the market's information environment in 
weak legal and disclosure regimes. This study complements Choi and Wong (2004) who 
find a substitution effect between audit and legal environments, and contributes to the 
literature by documenting that external audit plays a particularly important role in improv-
ing the market's information environment in poor legal and disclosure environments. 
In closing, we bring your attention to some limitations of this study. First, given that 
our sample period covers only the 1990s, the results of this paper may not be representa-
tive of current environments since substantial efforts to improve the audit quality and legal 
(and disclosure) environments have since been made across the world. Next, we do not 
control for the effects of auditor competency on audit quality (see for instance, DeAngelo 
1981) or firm-level auditor choice. Finally, we do not control for the location of analysts. 
However, it is not clear how these factors would have systematically biased our results. 
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